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23 May 62.

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MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: 16 May Letter to the President from the
Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board

The points raised by Dr. Killian in his 16 May letter to the President are well taken and I can assure you that the Department shares the concern expressed by Dr. Killian's Board and is fully conscious of the impact our outer space negotiations in the UN and elsewhere can have on the national security. All the position papers prepared to date for UN, Disarmament or other negotiations have been designed to protect our current reconnaissance satellite capabilities and our freedom of action in the future.

With regard to point (a) in Dr. Killian's letter, the Department believes that a thorough re-examination of US policy for the political handling of our reconnaissance satellite program is necessary and suggests that the President direct the issuance of a National Security Action Memorandum calling upon the Departments of State and Defense and on CIA to develop urgently recommendations on this subject for approval by the President. The Department of State would be happy to accept the chairmanship of the drafting group.

The other problems noted by Dr. Killian have already been dealt with or are in the process of settlement. Specifically, the position papers for the UN outer space

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meetings that open in Geneva on May 26 have been fully coordinated with the Department of Defense, NASA, ACDA, and where appropriate, with CIA. In the case of the particularly sensitive issue of a possible Soviet initiative for a joint declaration banning the use of outer space for reconnaissance, the position paper was also reviewed by the Special Group. I am not aware of any difference of views among the agencies concerned.

In this connection, the mechanisms for inter-agency coordination on outer space problems have worked well in the past and I am confident that they will prove adequate in the future. The Special Group, USIB and its sub-committee, and the individual agency liaison channels insure thorough and responsible review of position papers touching on reconnaissance satellite problems. In the special case of ACDA, which is not a member of the Special Group or of USIB, Bill Foster and I have taken steps to establish an effective liaison channel for all matters pertaining not only to satellite reconnaissance but to intelligence of all kinds. I believe such liaison already exists between ACDA and CIA and the Department of Defense.

On the question of briefing key US representatives involved in discussions on the uses of outer space at the UN or elsewhere on US satellite programs, the Department has already indoctrinated most of these officials. Ambassador Francis Filbert, senior US delegate, and Leonard Meeker, US representative to the Legal Subcommittee, have been cleared and briefed in connection with the forthcoming meetings in Geneva.

Since the negotiating forums and issues in the outer space field are growing in number and complexity, the Department foresees a need to brief more policy-making officers on the facts of our satellite reconnaissance programs than can reasonably be accommodated under the strict rules governing authorization for clearances. These officers would seldom have any requirement for access to operational details of these programs or to their intelligence product and thus could not qualify on a need-to-know basis for any of

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the existing clearances. I believe that a new clearance should be created for these cases which would provide maximum protection for the source but permit certain policy-making officials to know something of the US satellite programs. I have instructed the appropriate office in the Department to draw up proposals for this clearance and they will be forwarded to CIA for consideration in a few days.

I have enclosed for your approval a draft reply from the President to Dr. Killian in the sense of this memorandum. The members of the Special Group have concurred in this draft.

U. Alexis Johnson
Deputy Under Secretary

Enclosure:

Draft reply from the
President to Dr. Killian.

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